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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF UTAH,
APPELLEE'S REPLY BRIEF
Plaintiff/Appellee.
vs.
SUZANNE NEBEKER,

Case No. 9917-89

Defendant/Appellant.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to Utah Code Annotated §78-2a-3(d) if the matters appealed from are
interlocutory in nature or (e) if the matters appealed from are a final
judgment or order.
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED
Appellant appeals from an order in which the trial court denied a motion
to dismiss an Amended Information which was filed after the trial court
declared a mistrial because the defendant had claimed that they were surprised
by the prosecutor's election to include two incidents of claimed child abuse
in the same information.
1.

The issues raised are:

Whether the bringing of the second information after a

mistrial is barred on double jeopardy grounds;
2.

Whether the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the

amended information due to the prosecutor's notification to defendant that
there existed a video tape and that the defendant could make arrangements to
view or copy the video tape; and
3.

Whether the prosecutor filing of an amended information after

a mistrial and gaining an additional count and embodying two incidents as had
previously been embodied in one count as two separate counts constitutes
prosecutorial vindictiveness.
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STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
In this case there are questions of law.
for correctness.

State

v.

Layva,

Questions of law are reviewed

951 P.2d 738, 739-743 (Utah 1997).

An issue

which is part of and important to the double jeopardy issue is whether or not
the defendant acquiesced in, agreed to or in some way helped initiate the
mistrial, thereby waiving the defense of a bar on double jeopardy grounds.
This is a question of fact which the court reviews for an abuse of discretion.
Toone

v.

Toone,

952 P.2d 112, 114 (Utah App. 1998) (quoting Hill

P.2d 721, 724 (Utah App. 1992)).

v. Hill,

841

The trial court's decision on a question of

fact is entitled to a presumption of validity (Ruhsam

v.

Ruhsam,

742 P.2d 123,

124 (Utah App.' 1987) ) .
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Where the trial court declared a mistrial with the knowledge,

consent and on the insistence of the defendant, is the prosecution of the same
offense on an amended information precluded on double jeopardy grounds?
B.

Does the prosecutor's notification to the defendant that

there existed a video tape interview of the victim and the indication that the
defendant could obtain a copy of the tape by making arrangements for the
appropriate costs violate the Utah State Constitution or constitute
prosecutorial misconduct for failure to provide discovery?
C.

Does the prosecutor's filing of a two-count information for child

abuse based upon two incidents approximately eight days apart constitute
prosecutorial vindictiveness, where the original one-count information
embodying both incidents as one abuse did not result in a verdict where a
mistrial was declared?
D.

Has the Defendant preserved a due process claim where she only

stated in her Motion to Dismiss on "constitutional grounds'' .
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A.

NATURE OF THE CASE
Judge Lyle R. Anderson declared a mistrial in the Seventh Judicial

District Court on December 17, 1999, when the defendant, through her counsel,
indicated that she was surprised by the way the prosecution was intending to
proceed, in that the prosecutor had elected to consolidate two incidents, one
occurring on November 28, 1998 and the second occurring on December 6, 1998,
into one count of child abuse.
Defendant claimed surprise and an inability to defend.

The defendant

requested a mistrial and the Court declared such mistrial.
The State then refiled the action alleging two counts of physical abuse
of a child; a separate count for each incident - one occurring on November 28,
1998 and the other on December 6, 1998.
The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the amended information based
upon "constitutional grounds", double jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness
and failure to provide adequate discovery".
This is an appeal from the Seventh Judicial District Court's denial of a
Motion to Dismiss.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS
On December 17, 1999, Suzanne Nebeker was brought to trial on the charge

of child abuse.

The prosecutor notified the court that the one count covered

two incidents, beginning on November 28, 1998 and continuing until December 6,
1998.

The charging document indicated that the abuse occurred on or about the

28th day of November, 1998.
Counsel for defendant indicated he had been prepared to proceed on an
incident occurring on November 28, a Sunday, just before the victim moved out
of the home.

This understanding actually combines both events.

November 28,

1998, was the Saturday following Thanksgiving, and "Sunday" (December 6) is
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the concluding date,

to which the prosecutor referred as being a continuation

of the same event or events.
surprised by this action,

The defense asserted that they had been

had not had an opportunity to prepare and requested

that the Court grant the defendant a mistrial.
Following a noon recess and a detailed questioning of Defendant and her
counsel as to their desire for a mistrial, the Court granted a mistrial.
prosecutor later filed a two-count amended information
incidents.
jeopardy.

The

separating the two

Defendant claimed filing of the amended information was double
Defendant claimed at trial that the prosecution failed to provide

transcripts of video taped interviews and this was a reason
defendant was .compelled to request a mistrial.

that the

Finally, the defendant claims

that because the prosecutor filed the incidents as one count in the original
information, and now had separated the incidents into two counts, that this
action constituted prosecutorial vindictiveness.
It is from the Court's denial of the Motion to Dismiss on the foregoing
grounds that this appeal is taken.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This matter proceeded on a one-count information for child abuse
pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-5-109(3)(a) alleging that the defendant
had intentionally or knowingly inflicted injury upon a child on or about
November 28, 1998 (Court File Page 1 (CF 1)). Although the Defendant
initially represented herself and filed some pleadings (Per se pleadings were
prepared by Defendant's counsel) (Transcript 147-148), she was represented by
counsel at the trial of the matter on December 17, 1999. (Notice of
Appearance, CF 28)
A jury was empaneled and seated, but prior to opening arguments, the
Prosecutor requested a side bar with the Judge.

A partial transcript of that

side bar was transcribed by Defendant's counsel and appears to be an accurate
representation of what occurred. (CF 81) During the side bar the Prosecutor
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stated that the original information memorialized an occurrence beginning on
or about the 28th day of November, and continued until the 6th day of December,
when the victim moved out of the home.

It was the intent of the Prosecutor to

treat the incidents of child abuse over that period of time as one incident
and to only charge it as one count.

Defense counsel expressed surprise and

indicated to the court that he was not prepared to proceed.
The Prosecutor gave opening argument and at the closing of his opening
argument objection was made by defense counsel which concerned the subject of
the earlier side bar.

Defense counsel also expressed his understanding of the

nature of the case he was defending (Transcript p.36).

Counsel had received

an incident report from San Juan County Sheriff's Deputy Kelly Bradford, which
indicated that the victim had been hit and kicked by her stepmother
(defendant) on the Saturday following Thanksgiving.

(See Exhibit D to

Prosecutor's Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, CF
196).

The date of November 28 corresponds to the Saturday following

Thanksgiving in 1998.

Defense Counsel also received the Child Protective

Services Report (CPS Report of Chris Veach) (Tr. 92-121, 157-182)

The first

entries on page 1 dated December 4, 1998, indicated that an incident had
occurred on Saturday night,

that her mother and her had had an argument, and

that they saw marks on her (CF 92). The Report further indicated an interview
which occurred on the 8th day of December, 1998, which stated that on Sunday
night the Defendant had thrown a phone at her, had broken a window and that
the victim had left the residence.

(CF 94-95)

The reports which were in the possession of the Defendant set forth two
separate dates.

The knowledge of Defense Counsel

as to these two incidents

can be gleaned from the following statements:
Mr. Collins:uThe report given to me, Your Honor, indicate an
interview on December 8, 1999[sic], with Lindsay Watson, in which
she claims that abuse occurred on the 28th of November, which was a
Sunday evening and that on the following day, Monday, she was - -
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- ran away from home and did not return after that to the home."
(Transcript 36-37)
•

•

*

The Court:"And I think I'm now getting a picture on this issue
over whether we are trying what happened on the 28th or what
happened on the 6th or what happened together. And I am getting a
picture that in your mind these things got blurred because you
told me when we started here that something happened on Sunday and
the next day she went to school and left. That's the 6th of
December. So apparently you came here prepared to address what
happened on that Sunday"
Mr. Collins: I understood that was the 28th, but apparently that's
not the 28th." (Transcript 116)
•

*

*

The Court:" . . . you said, Mr. Collins, that you're not prepared
to defend the 6th, but in fact it now appears that most of what you
knew about this is actually conduct on the 6th, which you thought
was on the 28th, but if you still object to him trying both counts
as one . . . (Transcript p.118)
•

*

*

Mr. Collins:"During the interview, Ms. Nebeker or Ms. Watson,
talking about the witness who testified stated that she had been
hit and kicked by her stepmother who is Ms. Suzanne Nebeker. This
happened the Saturday after Thanksgiving, 1998. Ms. Watson left
the home and was placed in shelter care. Ms. Watson is currently
in foster care situation and there is a restraining order in place
against Ms. Nebeker.
And then it goes on about some other things that occurred in 1999.
As a result, Your Honor, it was our understanding from discovery
and the case we prepared for, that what we were dealing here was
with the events of the 28th of November.
The Court: I need to ask you something,
during the side bar conference that you
case about something that happened on a
left the house the next day after going

Mr. Collins. You told me
were expecting to try a
Sunday and that the child
to school.

Mr. Collins: Correct, Your Honor.
The Court: That matches the 6th and 7th of December.
Mr. Collins: That's correct. It does now. At the time I told the
Court that my understanding was the 28th was a Sunday and that she
had left on a Monday, that's why I told the Court now that, that's
how I understood it, that's how I, in fact, made my opening
statement to the jury because based on these records, that's what
it said.
Now I understand, Your Honor, that we have two counts that we are
talking about.
The Court: That we have two instances.
Mr. Collins: Two instances that we are talking about. Totally
different incidences and frankly I was very surprised to learn
that, and the Court is correct, that now it appears that the 28th
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is a Saturday, something I learned as we went through the trial
and that the 6th is a Sunday, which is approximately a week later.
Something I was not prepared for. Counsel has argued those
incidences to the jury."
(Transcript p.145-146)
•

•

*

Mr. Collins: " . . . I have a massive amount of information about
this case . . .
I can honestly tell the Court that as I came here
today, and I reread all the discovery that I received from the
court before coming today. In fact, I reread it this morning. Got
up early. That I honestly understood that we were dealing with an
incident that occurred on what I believed to be the 28th of
November, a Sunday, and on the next day this child went to school,
did not come home, and that the incident then moved forward from
there to the CPS custody."
(Transcript p.150)
•

*

•

Mr. Collins: "That's why when counsel stood up I was very
surprised this morning. This did not seem like a difficult case
to me with events that occurred on the 28th.
The Court: So what you're expecting to hear is what you heard
about. What you were expecting to hear was evidence about, well,
the conduct you were expecting to hear about was conduct occurring
on a Sunday, followed by a child's departure from the home. And
you have actually heard about that.
Mr. Collins: The following day.
The Court: But the date was not the 6th of December.
Mr. Collins: It's not quite that simple because we now have an
intervening week that I have
to deal about that I didn't know
about. That's what I'm telling the Court. I, yes, I knew about
the alleged conduct of the 6th. (Transcript p. 151) .
Mr. Collins was invited by the Court to take the noon recess and
determine whether he would ask for a mistrial.

Upon returning from the

recess, Mr. Collins requested that the Court declare a mistrial.

The Court's

reasoning and direct examination of the Defendant occurs in the Transcript at
pages 159-161:
Ms. Nebeker: Your Honor, I have spoken with my attorney. He has
given me all of the options and I think I have a fairly good
understanding of, urn, the facts here and, urn, I feel like it, it
would be at this point in my best interest to, to consider this
option.
The Court: You're not just considering that your asking for it
now.
Ms. Nebeker: I'm asking for it, you're correct, I am.
The Court: You could go away tonight completely exonerated and
free of any further shadow and by doing by you're doing, you're
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prolonging this. It may, you think, after your, and I don't want
to pry into your conversation with your attorney, but you are
comfortable with this decision?
Ms. Nebeker: Yes, sir.
The Court: Okay. Well, that's what I'm going to do. I'm going to
declare a mistrial and schedule a new trial. Mr. Halls, I'll give
you a chance if you want, to file an Amended Information, to do
so. Bring the jury in and I'll tell them the good news."
(Transcript p. 159-161)
An Amended Information was filed separating the two incidents, alleging
one count of child abuse occurring on November 28, 1998, and another instance
occurring on December 6, 1998.
14, 2000.

The Amended Information was filed on January

(CF 53).

The Defendant filed a Motion to Dismiss the Amended Information, stating
in the Motion "upon constitutional grounds" (CF 54) and in the Memorandum in
Support of the Motion to Dismiss on the "ground of double jeopardy,
prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to provide adequate discovery."

(CF

64)
The Court heard oral arguments on the Motion to Dismiss on February 3,
2000.
The Court made Findings of Fact (CF 227-231).

The Court found that the

mistrial was requested by defense counsel (Finding 1, 2 and 3; CF 227-228).
The Court found that there was no bad faith on the part of the prosecutor's
filing a single criminal episode on two incidents approximately a week
apart.(Finding 4; CF 228).
The Court found that the prosecutor had complied in all respects with
discovery and that there was no violation of discovery and no bad faith on the
part of the prosecutor with regard to discovery (Finding 5; CF 228-229),
The Court found that requiring the Defendant to pay her own costs for
the copying of a video tape did not constitute "compelling" advancement of
money in violation of the Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12. (Finding
6; CF 229)
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The Court found that there was no vindictiveness on the part of the
Prosecutor in bringing the second charge and that the Prosecutor, by virtue of
evidence brought forth at the time of trial may have very well brought a
tampering with evidence charge, but did not do so.

(Findings 7 and 8; CF 229)

The Court found that the Prosecutor was willing to continue with the
trial and that he did not evidence a motive to provoke a mistrial in order to
obtain a more favorable hearing.

(Findings 9, 10 and 11; CF 229)
ARGUMENT
I

DEFENDANT HAS FAILED TO PRESERVE HER DUE PROCESS ARGUMENTS
The procedural context of this appeal is that the Defendant has objected
to the filing of an Amended Information after a mistrial was declared at the
Defendant's request.

Procedural and evidentiary matters which were part of

the trial are only appropriately questioned by the Defendant as it affects the
Court's ruling on whether charges could be refiled.

Yet, the Defendants

spends a number of pages in her brief discussing due process, and,
particularly at page 21, that failure to provide certain discovery violates
due process, with the emphasis in her argument that the Court's prospective
allowance of the testimony of two CPS workers constitutes a violation of due
process even though these people did not testify.

The Defendant has quoted a

number of cases saying that in certain states persons working as social
workers may be determined to be agents of the state and that Miranda would
have to be given.

This argument was not raised in Defendant's Motion to

Dismiss or her Memorandum in support therefore.

The question of whether a

judge properly ruled upon an evidentiary objection, based on Miranda, is moot
because the people did not testified and is moot when a mistrial is declared
on other grounds.
It is not sufficient for a party to simply move to dismiss an
information based on "'constitutional grounds". (CF 54)
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The Motion refers to

the Memorandum and states that u and for other reasons set forth in Defendant's
Memorandum".

The Memorandum simply claims that the reason for the appeal is

"double jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to provide adequate
discovery" (CF 64). Double jeopardy has its own constitutional basis (Article
I, Section 12). Objection on the basis of prosecutorial vindictiveness and
failure to provide adequate discovery do not signal an intention to preserve
an issue on due process grounds.

A party must make a specific objection or

run the risk of losing the ability to bring it on appeal.
Plateau

Mining

Corporation,

In Jones

v.

Cyprus

944 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 1997), a party objected to

a jury instruction by simply stating that it misstates the law.

The Court

stated:
"Because Cyprus's objection to Instruction 41 was not adequately
preserved for appeal due to the lack of specificity in its initial
objection, we need not rule on whether the instruction was
correct. Under Utah law, objections must be raised with
sufficient specificity at trial for the trial judge to have a
legal basis for altering or rejecting the instruction/7
Similarly, in State

v.

Winward,

941 P.2d 627, 633 (Utah Ct. App. 1997),

a criminal case in which the defendant was being tried for sexual abuse of a
child, the defendant had some objection to a prosecutor's questioning and to
statements made in a closing argument, but simply objected on relevance
grounds, did not renew the objection in the prosecutor's closing, and did not
ask for a curative instruction, the Court stated:
"A contemporaneous objection or some form of specific preservation
of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record
before an appellate court will review such claims on appeal.
Importantly, the grounds for objection must be distinctly and
specifically stated. Quoting State
v. Johnson,
1A P.2d 1141, 1144
(Utah 1999); quoting State v. Tillman,
570 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah
1987) .
In State

v.

Irwin,

924 P.2d 5, 7 (Utah Ct. App 1996), a sexual abuse

case, the question arose as to whether the prosecutor had breached a plea
agreement by failing to stand moot at sentencing.
"It is a well established rule that a defendant who fails to bring
an issue before the trial court is generally barred from raising
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it for the first time on appeal. Quoting State
v. Lopez,
886 P.2d
1105, 1113 (Utah 1994); State
v. Archambeau,
820 P.2d 920, 922
(Utah App. 1991).
In State

v. Burns,

98 Utah Advance Report 32, 2000 WL 868493, 1, 3 (Utah

June 2000), a case in which a person convicted of murder was appealing the
State's denial of expert assistance unless a legal services counsel was
representing the person, the Court stated:
"It is true that an appellate court generally will not review any
issue that was not raised in the court below. . . Accordingly in
Cunningham we declined to address a statute of fraud's issue
because the plaintiff had not raised it before the trial court.
It was first raised in a post-trial memorandum. See
Cunningham,
690 P.2d at 552, Note 2. Furthermore, in Giles we declined to
reach the issue of attorney's fees because the issue was not
raised until appeal. See Giles 657 P.2d at 289."
Defendant did not raise any due process claims in her motion or
memorandum.

Defendant's memorandum states that they are basing their grounds

for requesting the Court to dismiss the Amended Information on double
jeopardy, prosecutorial vindictiveness and failure to provide adequate
discovery.

The Motion simply states "upon constitutional grounds".

This is

not specific enough to preserve the issue of due process as it has not been
set forth in the Defendant's pleading or argument.

While the cases cited

deal mainly with issues raised during trial, the same applies to Defendant's
Motion to Dismiss.

The issue of due process needed to be raised in specific

terms in order to be preserved.
II
DOUBLE JEOPARDY DOES NOT BAR THE PROSECUTION OF THIS
DEFENDANT IN A SECOND INFORMATION.
The Utah Constitution at Article I, Section 12, states "nor shall any
person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense".

Utah Code Annotated

§76-1-403 states in pertinent part:
"(4). . . however termination of the prosecution is not improper
if: a)the defendant consents to the termination; or b) the
defendant waives his right to object to the termination; or c) the
court finds, and states for the record, that the termination is
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necessary because (i) it is physically impossibly to proceed with
the trial and conform with the law; or (ii) there is a legal
defect in the proceeding not attributable to the state that would
make any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible as a matter of
law; or (iii) prejudicial conduct in or out of the courtroom not
attributable to the state makes it impossible to proceed with the
trial without injustice to the defendant or the state . . . "
Numerous Utah cases have addressed the issue of double jeopardy as it
applies to the Utah and Federal constitutions.
years, have quoted State

v. Ambrose,

Many of those cases, in recent

598 P.2d 354 (Utah 1979).

The underlying

proposition is that a defendant is entitled to have a verdict rendered by a
particular tribunal unless there is some manifest necessity for having that
right removed.

In Ambrose

the Utah Supreme Court said that the discharge of a

jury without a verdict operates as an acquittal unless (1) the defendant
consents to the discharge or (2) legal necessity requires the discharge in the
interest of
United

States

justice.

Id. at 358.

v. Journ,

This philosophy

was taken

from

the case

of

400 U.S. 470, 485 (1970) where the court explained:

"If that right to go to a particular tribunal is valued, it is
because, independent of the threat of bad faith conduct by judge
or prosecutor, the defendant has a significant interest in the
decision whether or not to take the case from the jury when
circumstances occur which might be thought to warrant a
declaration of mistrial. Thus, where circumstances develop not
attributable to prosecutorial or judicial overreaching, a motion
by the defendant for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any
barrier to reprosecution even if the defendant's motion is
necessitated by prosecutorial or judicial error."
The court will find in each of these cases that in order to bar a
retrial there must be bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor.

This

legal rational has also been followed through the federal system and is stated
in a case of

United

States

v. Dinitz,

424 U.S. 600, 607-608(1976), where it

states:
"The state may usually retry an accused if he procures the
declaration of a mistrial; however, the double jeopardy clause
bars retrial where bad faith conduct by a judge or prosecutor is
intended to provoke a mistrial request, and thereby allow the
state an additional opportunity to convict the defendant/'
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The authorities generally hold that if a defendant asks for a mistrial
he waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon double jeopardy
even though the prosecution provoked the error.
657 (Utah 1982) quoting State

v.

Ambrose.)

State v.

Jones,

645 P.2d 656,

Thus, the holding in Jones

stated:

"Thus, where circumstances develop not attributable to
prosecutorial or judicial overreaching a motion by the defendant
for mistrial is ordinarily assumed to remove any barrier of
reprosecution even if the defendant's motion is necessitated by
prosecutorial or judicial error."
In our case the Defendant sought the mistrial based upon her allegation
of surprise in the charging document.

Defense Counsel did not know that the

Saturday following Thanksgiving (November 28), and Sunday night before the
victim left the home (December 6 ) , were two different incidents, even though
the reports distinctly separate them and Counsel had reviewed both, but
thought they were the same day.

(Transcript 36-37, 116, 118, 145-146, 150-

151)
The Court, aware of the holding in Ambrose

went to great lengths to

determine if the Defendant understood the import of her request for a
mistrial.

(Findings CF 227) Ultimately, the Defendant sought and received a

mistrial (Transcript 159-161).

There was no indication of bad faith or that

the prosecutor had withheld discovery or sought a mistrial to obtain a better
result.

(Findings CF 227; CF 184) There was no indication of prosecutorial or

judicial error.
The State does not dispute that jeopardy had attached to the charge of
child abuse alleged to have occurred on or about the 28th day of November,
1998, because the jury had been empaneled, the first witness had been sworn
and the Court began to take evidence.

However, it does not necessarily follow

that since a mistrial has been declared that the retrial on the same charge is
barred.

In State v. Musselman,

667 P.2d 1061, 1065-1066 (Utah 1983) the court

stated:

13

"It is not however necessarily true that a retrial is barred by
the double jeopardy clause in all cases once jeopardy has attached
. . . When a defendant's motion for a mistrial is granted, the
jury is unable to reach a verdict or a conviction is reversed on
appeal for errors of law in the trial of the case, a defendant may
be retried not withstanding the double jeopardy clause. Quoting

E.g.,

Lee v.

United

States,

432 U.S. 23 (1977); State

v.

Jaramillo,
25 Utah 2d 328, 481 P.2d 394 (1971); State
v.
Gardner,
62 Utah 62, 217 P.2d 976 (1923); see United States
v. Scott,
437
U.S. 82 (1978) (Scott held that where a defendant "seeks to
terminate the trial before a verdict on grounds unrelated to
factual guilt or innocence" i.d. at 87 the double jeopardy clause
does not bar retrial.)(Emphasis added)

In the case of State

v.

Trafny,

799 P.2d 704, 709 (Utah 1990) the

defendant seeking a dismissal on double jeopardy grounds tried to established
the prosecutor had shown bad faith by not providing portions of lab reports in
a rape case.

In Trafny

the court stated:

"If a defendant seeks a mistrial he waives any defense he might
otherwise assert based upon double jeopardy even though the
prosecution or the court provoked the error unless it can be shown
that the bad faith conduct by the judge or prosecutor is intended
to provoke a mistrial so as to afford the prosecution a more
favorable opportunity to convict/7 Id. at 709.
The court, in Trafny,

failed to grant the request of the defendant for a

dismissal on double jeopardy grounds because the court stated:
"In the instant case there is no indication that the prosecution
intentionally or in bad faith withheld any of the lab reports in
order to cause a mistrial, thereby improving the chances of
conviction in a new trial."
The court required the record reflect bad faith on the part of the
prosecution by intentionally withholding exculpatory evidence in order to
provoke a mistrial to gain some tactical advantage in order for a dismissal on
double jeopardy grounds to be allowed.
It appears from the case law that the Defendant,

to succeed with her

double jeopardy argument, must show three things: 1) that there was "bad
faith" by the judge or prosecutor and motive to provoke a more favorable trial
in order to 2) afford the prosecution a more favorable opportunity to convict.
State

v.

Jones,

645 P.2d 656, 657 (Utah 1982), and 3) if a defendant seeks a
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mistrial he generally waives any defense he might otherwise assert based upon
double jeopardy, even though the prosecution or the court provoked the error.
State

v. Rudolph,

970 P.2d 1221, 1232 (Utah 1998) quoting State

P.2 704, 709 (Utah 1990).

As was the case in Rudolph,

v.

Trafny,

799

the defense in this

case must demonstrate that the prosecutor provoked the mistrial and further
that the prosecution did so intentionally so as to provide a more favorable
opportunity to convict.
The Court found no bad faith on the part of the Prosecutor or the
defendant (Transcript of Proceeding on Motion to Dismiss (Tr. MTD) p.21, et
seq.):
A.-

In making the charges (Tr. MTD p. 21)

B.

In providing discovery (Tr. MTD p.21)

C.

In not determining earlier that the incidents occurred over 8

days (Tr. MTD p.23)
The prosecutor made every effort to complete the trial and to proceed
with the jury upon the charging document before the court.

The Prosecutor

asked the Court to make a finding on the motive of the Prosecutor to provoke a
mistrial.

The Court said (Tr. MTD p.24):
U

I just don't think there's any basis in the record for that. It
was clear to me that the prosecutor very definitely did not want a
mistrial and was very much inclined to go forward. . . But what I
believe is that the prosecutor just didn't want to have to do this
twice. It's miserable enough doing it once. He was willing to
take his chances of losing the case the first time around. That's
what I was seeing in the courtroom. I was seeing a prosecutor
that wanted to go forward - very much wanted to go forward, even
though he might - he might have some advantages from coming back
with a second trial with two counts."
The Court very specifically, "very pointedly", (Tr. MTD p.20) asked
Defense counsel and Defendant if this was their desire to move for a mistrial
after admonishing them that it may not be in the Defendant's interest
(Transcript 159-161).

The Defendant has failed to establish bad faith, a

motivation on the part of the prosecutor to retry the case or that a retrial
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would provide a more favorable opportunity to convict.

The Defendant

requested the mistrial with full knowledge of the consequences and has,
according to Utah law, waived her right to contest a retrial on double
jeopardy grounds.
Ill
DISCOVERY
A.

DEFENDANT'S OBJECTION FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE DISCOVERY
IS UNTIMELY.

Rule 12(b) of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure states:
"Any defense, objection or request, including requests for ruling
on admissibility of evidence which is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue may be raised prior to
trial by written motion.
The following shall be raised at least
five days prior to the trial:
. . . (3) Requests for Discovery where allowed;"
The statement that the Prosecutor failed to comply in providing any
materials relating to video tapes or transcripts is untimely.
was notified that video tapes existed.

The Defendant

It is stated in both the report of

Officer Kelly Bradford (Transcript 186) and in the Answer to Request for
Discovery (Transcript 187) that video or audio tapes exist.
in advance of the trial of the matter,

This was provided

within three days of the request.

If

the Defendant had concern that some materials (transcripts) were not provided
she had an obligation pursuant to Rule 12 to raise the issue with the Court at
least five days prior to the trial.
B.

THE PROSECUTION PROVIDED ALL DISCOVERY MATERIAL; THERE
WAS NO DISCOVERY VIOLATION.

The Defendant, mostly through innuendo, asserts that the State failed to
provide discoverable information.

This point is refuted by the Court in the

Findings (Transcript 228, Findings paragraph 5) where the Court found that
there was no bad faith on the part of the Prosecutor with regard to discovery
and that there was no violation of discovery.
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Going to the Court record, it

is made clear that the material the Defendant continually stated was withheld
by the Prosecution never existed.

No case law or statute has required law

enforcement officers to transcribe taped statements.

If those materials

(transcripts) do not exist, the State is not required to manufacture them.
It was clear from the Court's findings on motions presented at the trial
that the State asserted on several occasions that a transcript did not exist,
yet the Defendant continues to raise a question with regard to the
Prosecutor's integrity by inferring that the reports exist, but that the
Prosecutor claimed there were no reports.

(Defendant's brief p.21)

This should not be a confusing issue for the Defendant.

It was

explained clearly on several occasions that those persons whom the State
intended to have testify, being Mr. Webb and Mr. Hatch, did not prepare
independent reports; their notes and observations were included in the report
of Chris Veach:
"Mr. Collins: The other problem I have, Your Honor, is that I have
gotten no reports from these people that have supposedly done the
interviews. I have a report, once again, Chris, that summarizes
what supposedly happened. But I have nothing from those gentlemen
who are going to testify. If there are such reports I ask that
they be reproduced so I can review them before they testify.
The Court: Well?
Mr. Halls: Your Honor, there are no such reports. I think in
talking with Robert Hatch he made some notes and I don't, I don't
have those notes and I don't think Mr. Collins is entitled to
those notes. So what I have is, basically his notes were included
in Ms. , in Chris Veach's reports, which he has gotten."
The issue was again raised in the Motion hearing on February 23, 2000,
where the State indicated to the Court that no transcript existed.

Yet the

Defendant continues to allege or infer that because they didn't have a
transcript of that interview that the State was somehow withholding it.
Prosecutor stated that Mr. Webb and Mr. Hatch reported to Chris Veach and
their findings were included in her report.
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The Prosecutor stated:

The

"They made no reports; there is no report; there still is no
report.
The Court: Transcript or report, Mr. Halls?
Mr. Halls: There is a report in Chris Veach's statement. There is
no transcript. They didn't make, they didn't make a separate
report. They reported to the case worker, Chris Veach, and it is
in her document that they received."
(Tr. MTD p.6)
Collins again questions the integrity of the Prosecutor in his
where he states:
"The Court asked counsel whether or not there was no report or
whether or not there is no transcript. That question never got
answered; which is a question I would like to know about. In
other words we are told they videotaped the victim, the alleged
victim in this case, but were not told whether or not there is a
transcript of that.
We're told that apparently, and I don't know this to be a fact,
but is seems like apparently the interview with the defendant was
also taped, but we're told that we don't know that there was a
transcript of that. Just that these folks were going to get up
and testify to something she said, having made no notes, having
made no reports, having made no reporting, apparently, but never
having a transcription of it. So that seems interesting that we
don't . . .
The Court: I thought I got an answer, Mr. Collins.
Mr. Collins: I'm sorry.
The Court: I thought I did get an answer.
Mr. Collins: What?
didn't understand.

Is there a transcript or isn't there?

The Court: No, he didn't give you a reading.
transcript?

I

Is there a

Mr. Halls: Well, then, Mr. Collins, here today The Court: Hang on, do you want to know if there is a transcript of what?
Mr. Collins: Of either the video tape or the interview, taped
interviews.
The Court: Is there a transcript of either the video tape or the
taped interviews?
Mr. Halls: See, here is another mischaracterization. I did not
say there was a video tape or the interview between Mr. Hatch and
Mr. Webb.
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The Court: You know/ it would just help if you would just say
there wasn't a tape of it. Is there a tape?
Mr. Halls: There is a tape.
with the victim.
The Court: Okay.

There's a video tape of an interview

Is there a transcript of that video tape?

Mr. Halls: No.
The Court: Thank you.
Mr. Halls: And I don't, and there is not a video tape of the other
interview. It's basically these people's notes as given notes or
understanding as given to Ms. Veach.
The Court: Okay.

(Tr. MTD p. 13-15)

The State's response to the Defendant's discovery requests indicates
that the Prosecution fully complied.

There is nothing in the record which

indicates that there was any material withheld from the defense.
Defendant quotes the case of State

v.

James,

The

858 P.2d 1012 (Utah App. 1993)

for the proposition that the court not requiring that statements be recorded,
"inferred" the importance of recording certain statements.

In fact, the Court

in that case indicated that some problems which occasionally arise with regard
to statements could be averted if recorded.

But there was and is no

requirement that the investigating officers for the state record certain types
of statements.

Defendant then "bootstraps" from this case to a conclusion on

page 23 of her brief where she states "at a minimum Defendant was entitled to
a report in advance of trial by these two (2) CPS workers so that she could
prepare to meet their testimony".

Defendant would have been entitled to

receive that material if there had been a transcript of such statement.

Since

a transcript did not exist, the Defendant is not entitled to receive from the
prosecution, materials which do not exist.
violation at all.

The Court found no discovery

(Tr. MTD p.21)

In the case of State

v. Carter,

707 P.2d 656, 661-662, the Court

analyzed Utah Code Annotated §77-35-16, a statutory provision which has since
been codified as Rule 16 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure.
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This was a

case in which the defendant had formally requested discovery and the
prosecution had made all of their materials available to the defendant by
giving him the case file.

The specifics of what one of the witnesses informed

the prosecution he knew just prior to trial were not given to the defense.
The Court in analyzing the statute covering discovery violation reviewed the
first five points of the statute (now Rule 16) which states:
"Except as otherwise provided the prosecutor shall disclose to the
defense upon request the following material or information of
which he has knowledge: (1) relevant written or recorded
statements of the defendant or co-defendants; . . . (4) evidence
known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the guilt of the
accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or mitigate the
degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and (5) any other
item of evidence which the court determines on good cause shown
should be made available to the defendant in order for the
defendant to adequately prepare his defense. . ." (Emphasis
added)
The rule requires the prosecutor to disclose material and information of
which he has knowledge.

If certain information does not exist because it has

not been produced in some form, it is not the obligation of the prosecutor's
office to produce a transcript of a video tape because that is the medium the
Defendant would like to view and work from.

C. NOTIFYING THE DEFENDANT THAT SHE MAY OBTAIN A COPY OF THE VIDEO TAPE
FOR A FEE DOES NOT VIOLATE DISCOVERY RULES OR THE UTAH CONSTITUTION.

The State answered Defendant's discovery request on October 15, 1999 in
response to a telephone request for discovery made on October 12, 1999, by
providing all of the prosecution's file material.

(Transcript p. 187-188)

At paragraph 4 of the State's Answer to Request for Discovery, the
prosecutor notified the Defendant of video and audio interviews by stating:
"There is a video and cassette tape of interviews of the victim.
Copies can be reproduced for a fee. Please advise if you want
copies made."
Defendant asserts that such a statement violates the Utah Constitution
at Article I, Section 12, by compelling the Defendant to advance money or fees
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to secure the rights provided by Article 12.

The Defendant asserts that such

tapes may contain exculpatory information which could have been used as a tool
to cross-examine the victim.

(Defendant's Brief p.26)

While these assertions

may be true, nothing prevented the Defendant or her counsel from coming to the
Prosecutor's office and viewing the tapes for that, or any other purpose.
Rule 16 provides that it is the prosecutor's responsibility to
"disclose" materials to the defendant.

Further, Rule 16 (5)(e) states:

"When convenience reasonably requires the prosecutor or defense
may make disclosure by notifying the opposing party that material
and information may be inspected, tested or copied at specified
reasonable times and places."
Nothing requires the State to pay for these materials.
represented by counsel of her choosing.

Defendant was

Defendant never made any motion or

representation to the Court that she was indigent.

Nothing in the discovery

rules requires the prosecution stand the cost of providing discovery of
photographs, video tapes or other materials to a defendant.

If the Court is

to take the assertion of the Defendant on this issue to its logical
conclusion, the prosecution would be obligated to pay all of the Defendant's
costs in pursuing her defense, which may include subpoenaing her own witnesses
or even paying her attorney fees.
conceded defendants this point.

The Court has certainly not indulged or
In the recent case of State

v.

Burns,

2000 WL

868493 (Utah June 2000), a case in which a defendant was denied the help of an
expert witness where the defendant was not using the legal defender's
association (LDA) counsel. The Court, in analyzing under what circumstances a
person could obtain the assistance of an expert, reviewed statutory authority
which provides that cities, counties and other government entities must make
provisions for the adequate defense of indigents under U.C.A. §77-32-1 (now
codified at §77-32-301:
"Nothing in Section 77-32-1 conditions expert assistance on the
appointment of state-funded counsel . . . Furthermore, it is
clear from the plain language of that section that a county must
provide the investigatory and other facilities necessary for a
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complete defense to every indigent person, not just to those
represented by the LDA. . . . The only deciding factor of
eligibility for this type of assistance are that the defendant in
a criminal case be indigent and that the investigatory and other
facilities be necessary to a complete defense/7 Id. at 6
"Furthermore, Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides that xupon showing that a defendant is financially unable
to pay the fees of an expert whose services are necessary for
adequate defense the witness fee shall be paid as if he were
called on behalf of the prosecution.' Quoting Utah Rules of
Criminal Procedure 15(a)[FN 5) There is no indication in this rule
that a defendant must be represented by LDA to qualify for this
assistance. Instead, the only prerequisite for eligibility are
financial inability to pay and necessity for an adequate defense.
It follows therefore that the only requirement for receiving
public assistance for expert witnesses are proof of necessity and
establishment of indigence/' Burns,
Id. at 6.
It is the State's contention that while the Burns

case dealt with the

provision of expert help, the same reasoning applies to the request by any
defendant that the State fund the cost of copying video tapes.

It is simply

not the responsibility of the State to pay the costs of Defendant's defense
except under the criteria as set forth in Burns, namely that the Defendant
establish her indigence and secondly, that she establish that the materials
sought were necessary for an adequate defense.

The Defendant was represented

by her own counsel and at no time ever made the assertion of being indigent.
The State is not responsible for providing copies of video tapes at the
State's expense.

Notice to Defendant that material pertinent to the case is

available does not "compel" any action on the part of the Defendant.

It

discloses the existence of material that the Defendant should then evaluate to
determine its usefulness to their defense.
IV
PROSECUTORIAL VINDICTIVENESS
A prosecutor's duty is to see that justice is done.

This means that a

prosecutor should be fair in his dealings, but there is nothing which says
that a prosecutor cannot be zealous, committed or even aggressive in the
pursuance of the prosecution of a case.
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A defendant is not entitled to a

"mellow or docile" prosecutor, but in any event the allegation of
prosecutorial vindictiveness can be belied by this observation.

The

prosecutor in this case sought to include all incidents from November 28
through December 6 into one count.

Had the case gone through to a verdict and

the defendant been convicted, she would only have one child abuse conviction
on her record.

It is the defense in this case that insisted that the

prosecution could not proceed, to the point of requesting a mistrial.

The

defense insisted that the incidents were separate and that they hadn't had
opportunity to prepare for both.

A mistrial having been declared, the

prosecutor is faced with a decision as to whether the matter should be filed
as a single incident or as two.

Is the prosecution required to ignore the

assertions of Defendant that this is not one criminal episode and choose which
count to prosecute or

take the simpler approach of just separating the

counts?
The trial court, in referring to the issue of vindictiveness, after
observing all of the proceedings stated:
"And I don't see vindictiveness here . . . I don't, don't find
that you've acted in bad faith . . .
I don't think it's
vindictive to file two charges. I actually heard evidence that
might be tampering with evidence and the prosecutor hasn't filed
that. So I don't see that there's an attitude of vindictiveness
towards the defendant."
(Tr. MTD 23)
"The Court: Well, the girl testified that there was a tape that
she was - - she had a tape where she was surreptitiously taping
what Ms. Nebeker was doing and Ms. Nebeker says xYou're not gonna
get that', pulled the stuff up . . .
Mr. Halls: She also testified, at the same time, that the mother
had made some comment to her about never bringing a charge or
taking it to court . . .
The Court: . . . Yeah. That's what I was thinking. That other
might have been tampering with a witness. I'm not saying they're
terrific cases. I'm just saying that if I had an over zealous
prosecutor here, I'd expect to see those charges filed, at least."
(Tr. MTD 24-25, Findings 7, Transcipt 229)
Defendant refers to statements that additional allegations "may be
looked into".

In the preparation of the case several of the victim's family
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members approached the prosecutor and indicated that they had been abused by
the defendant while they lived with her.

The prosecutor indicated they could

provide the appropriate information and it would be determined if additional
charges would be brought.

It is a part of a prosecutor's duty, when informed

of possible criminal activity, to invite the person to proceed to the point of
determining whether a crime has been committed.

A statement that the

prosecutor will conduct his duty is no evidence that he acted maliciously or
in bad faith or that there was any retaliatory motivation.
indication of exactly the opposite.

It is actually an

The State has been unable to find any

Utah cases on this issue; neither did the Defendant provide any Utah cases.
CONCLUSION
The Defendant failed to preserve her Due Process argument when she
failed either at trial or in the Motion to Dismiss to raise a claim of Due
Process as an issue.
Double Jeopardy is not a bar to reprosecution because the Defendant
moved the Court for the mistrial and hereby waived their claim to raise double
jeopardy, even if the prosecution or court provoked the error.

The Defendant

has failed to show any bad faith on the part of the State or court to provoke
a mistrial to provide a more favorable opportunity to convict.
The Defendant was given all discovery prior to trial, which included
notification that video and audio tapes existed.

The Defendant's failure to

object or request transcripts pursuant to Rule 12(b) precludes the issue being
raised on appeal.
produced.

However, there weren't any additional materials to be

There was no discovery violation.

The State is not required to fund discovery of defendants except where
the statutes require it, i.e., indigent defendants.
claims indigency and had her own attorney.

This Defendant never

Notice of the availability of

material does not "compel" Defendant to reproduce it.

She could have view the

material at the presecutor's office to determine its usefulness to her case.
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The Defendant has made no case whatsoever for a claim of prosecutorial
vindictiveness.

The Court found that the prosecutor made every effort to see

the trial to its conclusion and that evidence at trial showed that a witness
tampering charge was possible, but not brought.

The filing of the Amended

Information charging two separate counts is not vindictive.
Based upon the foregoing, the State requests the Court deny Defendant's
claim for relief and find against Defendant in each particular asserted by
her.

The matter should be remanded to the District Court for trial on the

amended information.
DATED this 6th day of September, 2000.
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ADDENDUM

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Article I, Section 12 [Rights of accused persons.]:
xx
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to
appear and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature
and cause of the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof,
to testify in his own behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses
against him, to have compulsory process to compel the attendance
of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public trial by
an impartial jury of the country or district in which the offense
is alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all
cases. In no instance shall any accused person, before final
judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure the
rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to
testify against her husband , nor a husband against his wife, nor
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense.
Utah Code Annotated Section 76-1-403(4):
"There is an improper termination of prosecution if the
termination takes place before the verdict, is for reasons not
amounting to an acquittal, and takes place after a jury has been
empaneled and sworn to try the defendant, or, if the jury trial is
waived, after the first witness is sworn. However, termination of
prosecution is not improper if:
(a)
(b)
(c)

The defendant consents to the termination; or
The defendant waives his right to object to the
termination;
The court finds and states for the record that the
termination is necessary because:
(i) It is physically impossible to proceed with
the trial in conformity with the law; or
(ii) There is a legal defect in the proceeding
not attributable to the state that would make
any judgment entered upon a verdict reversible
as a matter of law; or
(iii) Prejudicial conduct in or out of the
courtroom not attributable to the state makes it
impossible to proceed with the trial without
injustice to the defendant or the state; or
(iv) The jury is unable to agree upon a verdict;
or
(v) False statements of a juror on voir dire
prevent a fair trial.

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 12(b)(3);
"Any defense, objection or request, including request for rulings
on the admissibility of evidence, which is capable of
determination without the trial of the general issue may be raised
prior to trial by written motion. The following shall be raised
at least five days prior to the trial:
. . . (3) requests for discovery where allowed;. . .

Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure 16(a):
"Except as otherwise provided, the prosecutor shall disclose to
the defense upon request the following material or information of
which he has knowledge:
(1) relevant written or recorded statements of the defendant or
codefendants;
(2) the criminal record of the defendant;
(3) physical evidence seized from the defendant or codefendants;
(4) evidence known to the prosecutor that tends to negate the
guilt of the accused, mitigate the guilt of the defendant, or
mitigate the degree of the offense for reduced punishment; and
(5) any other item of evidence which the court determines on good
cause shown should be made available to the defendant in order for
the defendant to adequately prepare his defense.

Utah Code Annotated Section 77-32-301:
"Each county, city and town shall provide for the defense of an
indigent in criminal cases in the courts and various
administrative bodies of the state in accordance with the
following minimum standards:
. . . (3) provide the investigatory resources necessary for a
complete defense; . . .

